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Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation 
 
Cass R. Sunstein
* 
 
Abstract 
 
Many people believe that when national security is threatened, federal courts 
should defer to the government. Many other people believe that in times of crisis, citizens 
are vulnerable to a kind of “panic” that leads to unjustified intrusions on liberty. But to 
date, there is little information about what federal courts have actually done in this 
domain, especially in the period after the attacks of September 11, 2001. On the basis of 
a comprehensive study of relevant courts of appeals decisions in the aftermath of those 
attacks, this essay offers four findings. First, the invalidation rate is about 15 percent – 
low, but not so low as to suggest that federal courts have applied a broad rule of 
deference to government action. Second, the division between Republican and 
Democratic appointees is comparable to what is found in other areas of the law; contrary 
to reasonable expectations, there is no significant “compression” of ideological divisions 
in this domain. Third, and perhaps most strikingly, no panel effects are apparent here. 
Unlike in the vast majority of other areas, Republican and Democratic appointees do not 
appear to vote differently if they are sitting with Republican or Democratic appointees. 
Finally, judicial behavior cannot be shown to have changed over time. The invalidation 
rate is not higher in recent years than it was in the years immediately following the 9/11 
attacks. Explanations are ventured for these various findings, with particular reference to 
the absence of discernible panel effects. 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and the executive 
branch have embarked on a number of new initiatives, raising a series of fresh legal 
questions.
1 Many of those questions involve the relationship between national security 
and some kind of individual right. Does the president have the authority to detain people 
without trial?
2 Do existing provisions of law allow the use of military commissions?
3 Can 
certain information be withheld from the public?
4 When, exactly, does the government 
                                                 
* Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to the Program on Risk 
Regulation for valuable support; to Elisabeth Theodore, Emily Ullman, Beth Bell, and Jason Yen for 
indispensable research assistance; and to Cassandra Wolos for the statistical analysis, which saved me from 
many errors. Martha Nussbaum and Geoffrey Stone provided valuable comments on a previous draft. 
Special thanks to Adrian Vermeule for discussions that inspired this project; those discussions produced the 
hypotheses that are tested here. 
1 The literature is voluminous. For one account, see David Cole and Jules Lobel, Less Safe, Less Free: Why 
America is Losing the War on Terror (2007). 
2 See Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 407 (2004). 
3 See Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
4 See ACLU v. Dept. of Def., No. 06-3140-cv, 2008 WL 4287823 (2d. Cir. Sept. 22, 2008). 3 
need a search warrant to obtain access to previously private information?
5 May the 
executive engage in wiretapping?
6 
It is easy to find two sets of recommendations for how courts should approach 
such questions. On a widely held view, judicial deference is the appropriate presumption 
or even rule.
7 Courts lack information about the potentially serious consequences of their 
judgments, and the elected branches are the best position to balance the competing 
considerations. If courts should generally be reluctant to invalidate the decisions of the 
executive and legislative branches,
8 then their reluctance should be increased when 
national security is at stake.  
On a competing view, also widely held, the argument for a strong judicial role is 
not at all weakened when a national security threat leads the elected branches to test the 
legal boundaries.
9 In “perilous times,”
10 it might be thought, those branches are especially 
prone to a serious form of lawlessness, and it becomes all the more important for courts 
to insist on compliance with the rule of law. On this view, the system of checks and 
balances, including an independent judiciary, is no less dispensable when the stakes are 
high and damaging intrusions on liberty are likely.
11 Defenders of this position contend 
that history is on their side: Intrusions on civil liberties, popular at the time but 
indefensible in retrospect, have occurred at many periods in American history.
12 
While the competing normative positions have been defended in great detail, we 
know much less about what courts actually do. The literature on that question is sparse.
13 
In the post-9/11 era, it is essentially nonexistent. In this essay, I describe the results of an 
effort to compile and analyze all relevant courts of appeals decisions between 9/11 and 
the present. The principal findings are as follows: 
1.  The overall rate of invalidation is low. The government loses only 15% of the 
litigated cases – a lower figure than in almost all other domains of federal law. 
2.  There is a significant difference between the voting patterns of Republican 
appointees and those of Democratic appointees. The Republican invalidation rate 
is 12%; the Democratic invalidation rate is 23%. 
3.  In this domain, the standard panel effects are not found. The voting patterns of 
Republican appointees do not differ if they are sitting with zero, one, or two 
Republican appointees. The voting patterns of Democratic appointees are not 
affected by whether they are sitting with zero, one, or two Democratic appointees. 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., US v. bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (SDNY 2000). 
6 See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2006). 
7 See Richard A. Posner, Not A Suicide Pact (2007); Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the 
Balance (2007). 
8 See Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006). 
9 See David Cole and Lobel, supra note. 
10 See Geoffrey Stone, Perilous Times (2004). 
11 See William Rehnquist, All The Laws But One (1997), for a qualified endorsement of this view. 
12 See id. 
13 The best discussion is Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis, 80 NYU L Rev 1 (2005). 4 
This is a highly unusual finding; in the vast majority of domains of federal law, 
judicial votes are greatly affected by panel composition.
14 
4.  Invalidation rates have not changed over time. Contrary to what might well be 
expected, the invalidation rate was the same in the first three years after the 
attacks of 9/11 as in the following four years. 
 
My goal here is to elaborate these results and to offer some comments and 
explanations. In the process, I aim not only to explore the national security cases post-
9/11, but also to provide some more general remarks on the analysis of judicial voting 
patterns, and about what can and cannot be learned from quantitative studies of this sort. 
Part II offers a discussion of background and method; it also outlines the central findings. 
Part III attempts to explain them, with particular emphasis on ideological voting and on 
the largest puzzle, which is the absence of the standard panel effects. Part III explores 
why judicial votes, in ideologically contested cases, are typically affected by the votes of 
other judges on the panel. In the process, it offers an account of why the typical pattern is 
not observed in national security cases, and of when and why we should expect to see 
judges (and perhaps others) strongly affected by the views of their colleagues. 
 
II.  Background, Method, Results 
 
A. Ideological Differences and Panel Effects 
 
To understand the current study, it is important to have a general sense of other 
studies of judicial behavior, which have revealed three pervasive phenomena. The first is 
ideological voting. In numerous areas, Republican and Democratic appointees show 
significant differences in liberal voting rates.
15 This finding is based on conventional 
measures of ideological differences, by counting, as a “liberal vote,” a judgment in favor 
of (for example) affirmative action programs, campaign finance regulation, plaintiffs in 
sex discrimination cases, the right to choose abortion, or labor unions in cases involving 
the National Labor Relations Act. The difference between Republican and Democratic 
appointees varies by case category, but in many areas, it is significant; in a large data set, 
the overall difference is 12 percent.
16  
Of course it would be a mistake to conclude, from this difference, that judicial 
voting can be reduced to ideological predispositions. Even in the most ideologically 
contested domains, most decisions are unanimous, and judges typically agree across party 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Frank Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2006); James Brudney et al., 
Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 
60 Ohio LJ 1675 (1999); Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the DC Circuit, 83 
Virginia Law Review 1717 (1983); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: 
A Statistical Study, Journal of Legal Analysis (forthcoming 2009); Sunstein et al., supra note. 
15 Landes and Posner, supra note; Sunstein et al., supra, at 20-21; Cross, supra note. 
16 Id.; Landes and Posner, supra note. 5 
lines. Nonetheless, Republican and Democratic appointees show significant differences 
in liberal voting rates. Those differences mean that the outcome of many disputes is 
determined by the random assignment of judges to panels.
17 
The second phenomenon is ideological dampening. When they are in the minority 
on three-judge panels, both Republican and Democratic appointees show significantly 
more moderate voting patterns than when they are in the majority.
18 Apparently both sets 
of appointees are willing to offer collegial concurrences -- that is, they are willing to 
concur in cases even if they would reach a different result if they were in the majority. A 
simple way to demonstrate ideological dampening is to compare the voting patterns of 
Republican appointees on Republican-Democratic-Democratic (RDD) panels with those 
of Democratic appointees on Democratic-Republican-Republican (DRR) panels. In many 
areas of the law, those patterns are essentially identical.
19 Even when there is a significant 
overall difference between Republican and Democratic appointees, that difference is in 
that sense essentially wiped out because of panel effects.  
For example, Democratic appointees vote for sex discrimination plaintiffs 42 
percent of the time on RRD panels, while Republican appointees vote for such plaintiffs 
44 percent of the time on RDD panels.
20 Note that even on such panels, Democratic 
appointees show more liberal voting rates than do Republican appointees. On RRD 
panels, for example, Republican appointees vote for sex discrimination plaintiffs 37 
percent of the time, well below the 42 percent rate for Democratic appointees on such 
panels.
21 But ideological dampening is nonetheless significant, in the sense that the 
ideological tendencies of both sets of appointees are muted.  
The third phenomenon is ideological amplification. When sitting on panels 
consisting solely of appointees from the same political party (DDD or RRR panels), 
federal judges show significantly more ideological voting patterns than when sitting on 
mixed panels.
22 A simple way to show this difference is to compare the overall difference 
between Republican and Democratic appointees with the difference on unified panels, 
with the latter counting as the “polarized difference.”
23 The polarized difference is often 
double or even triple the overall difference. For example, Republican appointees show a 
liberal voting rate of 37 percent in sex discrimination cases, well below the Democratic 
rate, which is 52 percent.
24 But on RRR panels, Republican appointees show a liberal 
voting rate of 30 percent, and on DDD panels, Democratic appointees show a liberal 
voting rate of 60. The polarized difference of 30 percent is of course double the overall 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Sunstein et al., supra note, at 26-27. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 26. 
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 20-21. 
24 Id. at 20.  6 
difference of 15 percent. Differences of this magnitude are typical; they are the rule, not 
the exception.
25 
 
In numerous areas of federal law, ideological voting, ideological dampening, and 
ideological amplification are the basic findings.
26 It follows that the political affiliation of 
the appointing president is a relatively good predictor of judicial voting in ideologically 
contested cases – but that the political affiliation of the president who appointed the other 
two judges on the panel is at least a good predictor of judicial voting in such cases! These 
findings suggest that the standard figure, for judicial voting behavior, looks roughly like 
this: 
 
Figure 1 
 
Standard Voting Patterns of Federal Judges
30%
45%
60%
45%
60%
75%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
RR RD DD
Party Affiliation of Appointing President of 
Panel Members
L
i
b
e
r
a
l
 
V
o
t
i
n
g
 
R
a
t
e
Republican
Democrat
 
 
In a few areas, however, these patterns are not observed. First, ideological voting 
cannot be found in certain domains in which it might be expected; for example, there is 
no significant difference between Democratic and Republican appointees in criminal 
appeals and in cases involving the takings clause, congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause, punitive damages, and standing to sue.
27 It is possible that existing 
doctrine imposes significant discipline on judges in such cases, in such a way as to ensure 
that ideological predispositions do not matter to judicial votes. It is also possible that 
federal judges do not much disagree, across party lines, in such cases, and hence 
ideological voting is not observed.  
Second, panel effects cannot be found in cases involving abortion and capital 
punishment.
28 In those domains, ideological voting is unmistakable, in the sense that the 
                                                 
25 Id. at 26-27. 
26 See note supra. 
27 Sunstein et al., supra note, at 49. 
28 Id. 7 
disparity between Democratic and Republican appointees is substantial. But the votes of 
federal judges are unaffected by panel composition. Apparently judicial convictions are 
especially strong in this context, and hence neither ideological dampening nor ideological 
amplification is observed. How can the absence of those standard findings be explained? 
I shall turn to that question in Part III. 
Interestingly, and contrary to a reasonable prediction, the extent of the overall 
difference between Republican and Democratic appointees does not predict the existence 
of panel effects. In abortion cases, the overall difference in liberal voting is 16 percent. In 
capital punishment cases, it is 24 percent. The difference in liberal voting rates is even 
higher in the domain of affirmative action (28 percent) than in either of these areas, and it 
is also high in cases involving the National Environmental Policy Act (24 percent), 
abrogation of state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment (21 percent), sex 
discrimination (17 percent), and disability discrimination (16 percent).
29 But in those four 
areas, panel effects are substantial, as both ideological dampening and amplification are 
found.
30 What matters, then, is not the extent of the difference between the two sets of 
appointees, but the tenacity with which they maintain their convictions, and the former 
does not predict the latter.  
With this background, let us turn to the national security cases. 
 
B. Method 
 
  The data set consists of 111 courts of appeals decisions handed down between 
September 11, 2001 and September 10, 2008. The data set was generated by searching 
databases for a series of national security-related keywords
31 and then manually 
eliminating cases that turned out to be irrelevant. Cases were excluded if they did not 
seriously engage national security issues, if they involved review of immigration or 
asylum decisions, or if the federal government was not a party. Because a central goal of 
the project is to analyze panel effects, en banc decisions were also excluded. Not 
surprisingly, the cases that make up the data set involve highly disparate subjects; 
common themes included challenges to detention, to surveillance, or to government 
efforts to conceal information.   
  Judicial votes were categorized in terms of whether they favored the government. 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, this measure was simple to apply, but in some 
                                                 
29 Id. at 20-21. 
30 Id. at 26-27. 
31 The initial search string in Westlaw’s “cta” database was: (FISA "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION" 
ATLEAST3(TORTURE) GUANTANAMO "PATRIOT ACT" SY,DI("SEPTEMBER 11" "9/11" 
"NATIONAL SECURITY" TERRORISM TERRORIST TORTURE "WAR ON TERROR") 
((("NATIONAL SECURITY" & TERROR!) ATLEAST3(TERROR!) ATLEAST3("NATIONAL 
SECURITY")) & (FOIA WIRETAP DETAIN! DETENTION SURVEILLANCE "9/11" "SEPTEMBER 
11")) & da(aft 9/11/2001) & da(bef 9/14/2008) % ("IMMIGRATION JUDGE" "BOARD OF 
IMMIGRATION APPEALS")) 8 
cases the categorization was not straightforward, because several issues were involved, 
and the government won on some of them but lost on others. In such cases, the 
government was said to have “won” if the government received most of what it wanted 
and lost on a minor or peripheral issue. In these few cases, a discretionary judgment had 
to be made on that question. United States v. Moussaoui,
32 for example, the coding 
decision was not straightforward. The court of appeals ruled that it could order the 
government to produce enemy combatant witnesses for depositions, that a particular 
witness would be material to the Moussaoui defense, and that the particular deposition 
substitute proposed by the government was inadequate. But the court nevertheless 
affirmed the government’s central proposal, which was to offer a written substitute 
instead of producing the witness. This result was counted as a victory for the government. 
Discretionary judgments of this kind were necessary only in a very small subset of the 
cases. 
By our count, the panel majority found in favor of the government in a total of 94 
cases out of a total of 111. As is standard, judges were classified as Democratic or 
Republican appointees based on the party affiliation of the president who nominated 
them.
33         
 
C. Results 
 
Here are the basic results:  
 
Figure 2 
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32 365 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 2004).  
33 One judge had been nominated to a district court position by a Democrat and to his circuit court position 
by a Republican. Because the judge is himself a registered Democrat, he was assigned that affiliation for 
purposes of the analysis.  9 
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  The most noteworthy findings are simple to describe.  
 
1. The overall invalidation rate is low – about 15 percent. In terms of expected 
outcomes, very few areas of the law have been found to be so lopsided. For example, 
criminals win their appeals about one-third of the time,
34 punitive damage awards are 
invalidated over one-fifth of the time,
35 property owners win takings claims about 20 
percent of the time,
36 and disability plaintiffs win discrimination suits about one-third of 
the time.
37 Of areas that have been studied, the only one with a more lopsided rate 
involves challenges to congressional power under the Commerce Clause, in which the 
victory rate is about 5 percent.
38 
2. It might well be expected that the difference between Republican and 
Democratic appointees would be compressed in this domain. The area of national 
security might eliminate party differences; no judge would lightly rule that the 
government lacks authority to do what it deems necessary to protect the country. 
Surprisingly, however, there is no discernible compression. In a large data set, involving 
many domains, the average difference between the two sets of appointees was 12 percent; 
in ideologically contested cases as a whole, it was 15 percent.
39 The difference here is 11 
percent, which is statistically significant and very much in line with the overall findings. 
It is comparable to the differences in cases involving campaign finance regulation (14 
                                                 
34 Sunstein et al., supra note, at 49. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 26. 
38 Id. at 39. 
39 See id. at 21. 10 
percent), obscenity (9 percent), racial discrimination under Title VII (9 percent), and 
desegregation (9 percent).
40  
To be sure, the 11 percent difference is lower than what is observed at the highest 
end of the range of domains studied to date; in cases decided under the National 
Environmental Policy Act, there is a 24 percent difference, and in affirmative action 
cases, the difference is 24 percent.
41 But it cannot be said that Democratic and 
Republican appointees behave essentially the same in national security cases. Nor can it 
be said that the level of difference, in this domain, is significantly lower than what it is in 
most domains in which ideological voting is observed. 
3. It might also be expected that national security cases would follow the standard 
pattern shown in Figure 1, with rising liberal voting rates as the number of Democratic 
appointees increases, reflective of ideological dampening and ideological amplification. 
Because the sample size is relatively small, any conclusions on this point must remain 
somewhat tentative; but no such pattern is observed. The voting patterns of Democratic 
appointees cannot be shown to be associated with panel composition. Such appointees 
vote to invalidate government action about one-fifth of the time regardless of whether 
they are sitting with zero, one, or two Democratic appointees. In a striking contrast to 
other areas of the law, Republican appointees show the same voting patterns on RRD and 
RRR panels. To be sure, such appointees seem to show a modest shift in the liberal 
direction on RDD panels, but the difference is not statistically significant. The more 
general point is that none of the panel effects even approaches statistical significance. 
4. We might anticipate that in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, say 
between 2002 and 2004, judges would show a high rate of deference to the executive 
branch, and that validation rates would decrease from 2006 to 2008. In the aftermath of 
the attacks, the threat would be immediate, and courts might well be reluctant to 
invalidate government action that was initiated in order to reduce the relevant risks. As 
the immediacy of the attacks receded, perhaps judges would come to think that the 
danger had been overstated; perhaps they could be more willing to invalidate government 
action.  
No such pattern is observed. The rate of validation is essentially constant over the 
two time periods. The three plots in Figure 3 show the trend in invalidation rates; for 
clarity of exposition, they divide the relevant time period in different ways. The first plot 
divides the cases into three periods and calculates the rates within each period; the second 
gives annual invalidation rates; the third divides the cases into eleven time periods and 
calculates the rate within each period. 
 
                                                 
40 Id. at 20-21. 
41 Id. at 20. 11 
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Not surprisingly, the shorter time intervals show more variable invalidation rates, 
but the differences are not significant. The general point is that there is no measurable 
increase in invalidation rates over the time period studied; if anything, the invalidation 
rate actually decreases, but the trend is not statistically significant. 
 
III.  Explanations and Observations 
 
What lessons can be drawn from these findings? How do they compare with other 
domains of the law? What might be said about the approach of federal courts of appeals, 
after 9/11, to actions of government that are challenged in court? 
 12 
A. Invalidation Rates 
 
1. Two conclusions. The invalidation rate seems to suggest two conclusions. First, 
federal judges have been showing a high rate of deference to the executive branch.
42 
Second, the rate of deference is not nearly as high as it might be, or as it might be 
expected to be. Judges have not adopted anything like an irrebuttable presumption in 
government’s favor. In other words, the existing voting patterns seem to suggest that 
federal courts have repudiated both of the polar positions in the academic debate.  
2. Selection effects. These conclusions are reasonable and probably even correct, 
but we need to be careful with specific inferences. To evaluate the findings, it is 
necessary to ask two questions. What exactly is government doing in the relevant cases? 
And when are litigants willing to challenge government action? Without answers to these 
questions, any evaluations must be tentative. 
We could easily imagine a world in which total invalidation rates were 
significantly higher – say, 25 percent. But perhaps the higher invalidation rates, in that 
world, would be a product not of a more aggressive judiciary, but of greater litigant 
selectivity in deciding when to challenge government action. Such selectivity might stem 
from multiple sources. Perhaps social pressures are leading people to challenge 
government action, in this domain, only when it is clearly unlawful; or perhaps litigants 
are highly risk-averse, fearing that adverse rulings could entrench bad law. In short, a 
relatively high invalidation rate might reflect the selection of cases for litigation, and 
might not tell us that federal courts are not being deferential.  
Alternatively, we could imagine a world in which total invalidation rates were 
significantly lower than they are now -- say, five percent. But perhaps the lower rates, in 
such a world, would be a product of greater litigant willingness to challenge government 
action -- and also of greater caution, on the part of government, about testing the legal 
frontiers. Perhaps ideological litigants, in such a world, would challenge government 
action not only when they had a significant chance of success, but also for political or 
expressive reasons; perhaps they would not greatly fear validation. Perhaps government, 
in such a world, would stay well within the legal boundaries, fearing the consequences of 
invalidation in terms of frustration of its objectives, adverse public reactions, or both. If 
so, a low invalidation rate would not suggest a high level of judicial deference. 
  Which world is closer to ours? Without knowing, we cannot draw clear 
inferences about judicial aggressiveness. But it is nonetheless true that the 15 percent 
invalidation rate suggests both that courts are not adopting a broad rule of deference and 
that they are usually giving the government the benefit of the doubt. 
3.  No changes over time. As I have suggested, it might be expected that 
invalidation rates would increase over time. In the period immediately following the 9/11 
                                                 
42 For an interesting hypothesis about high deference rates from the lower courts, compared to the Supreme 
Court, see Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009). 13 
attacks, we might expect courts to adopt a general rule of deference, perhaps on the 
theory that any “balancing” should be tipped in the government’s favor. The salience of 
the attacks would seem likely to produce such deference. But as the attacks receded in 
time, and as no fresh attack occurred, a somewhat more aggressive posture might be 
expected. Alongside the passage of time, signals from the Supreme Court seemed 
inconsistent with complete deference.
43 For this reason as well, a higher rate of 
invalidation should be expected in the more recent period. 
The absence of any discernible change over time is a genuine puzzle. We can 
imagine four explanations. First, the hypothesis about salience effects might simply be 
wrong. It might simply be the case that the judicial posture in 2002 was not different 
from the judicial posture in 2007. Second, selection effects might be responsible for the 
absence of changes over time. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, litigants might 
have been reluctant to challenge government action unless it was clearly unlawful; more 
recently, they might be bringing closer cases.  
Third, the invalidation rates might mask important qualitative differences. 
Perhaps judges have indeed been taking a more aggressive approach, but perhaps their 
aggressiveness manifests itself, not in a higher invalidation rate, but in a willingness to 
strike down a few especially important programs, which they might have validated a few 
years before. Fourth, the absence of a discernible change might reflect the growing 
number of Republican (Bush) appointees to the federal courts, which might produce a 
shift in favor of the government in national security cases. Because the composition of 
the courts is not constant over time, a general decrease in salience effects, and hence 
greater judicial willingness to scrutinize government action, might be counteracted by 
new appointments to the federal bench.  
Unfortunately, the data do not permit us to choose among these four accounts. But 
a close reading of the cases does suggest that there are not fundamental differences in the 
posture of courts across the various periods; any such differences, if they even exist, are 
far more subtle than might be anticipated. 
4. A future inquiry (about the past). The study here is limited to national security 
cases after 9/11. It would be most valuable to ask the following question: What is the 
invalidation rate, in such cases, before 9/11? Suppose that in the relevant period, the 
invalidation rate is 40 percent. If so, we might be confident that there has been a “9/11 
effect,” in the sense that courts are now far more deferential than they were. 
A study of this sort would be quite valuable, and it would cast some light on the 
findings here. But it would raise its own puzzles. First, the number of national security 
cases, in the decades before 9/11, is relatively small; it would not be simple to obtain a 
sufficient large sample to produce helpful comparisons. Second, the national security 
cases before 9/11 are hardly the same as the national security cases after 9/11. To put the 
point provocatively, a comparison between the two might be a bit like comparing 
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punitive damages cases with national security cases. The reason is that the issues in the 
pre-9/11 era were so fundamentally different from those in the post-9/11 era that to treat 
them all as part of a unitary category called “national security cases” is probably 
unhelpful. Third, selection effects would confound comparisons. Litigants may well have 
different inclinations after 9/11, and hence it would not be easy to offer confident 
comparisons of invalidation rates in the different periods. 
 
B. Ideological Voting 
 
1. No compression. A reasonable prediction would be that in the aftermath of the 
attacks of 9/11, Democratic and Republican appointees would not be fundamentally 
different from one another. The hypothesis would be that the tragic consequences of the 
attacks, especially in the first decade after they occurred, would greatly compress 
ideological differences. There are at least crude analogies in the past. The Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Bd. of Education, for example, led to an apparent consensus 
between Republican and Democratic appointees, for a long period, in segregation cases; 
between 1945 and 1965, the two sets of appointees agreed with one another.
44 
Notably, no such compression is observed. Strikingly, the different inclinations of 
the two sets of appointees are strong enough to break out even in the aftermath of a 
national catastrophe. As we have seen, the 11 percent difference is not massive. But as 
we have also seen, it is statistically significant, and it is within the general range of 
differences observed in other areas of the law. 
2. A future inquiry (about the future) – a party effect?. In all of the relevant cases, 
federal judges confronted a Republican administration. Is this relevant? Would different 
judicial voting patterns be found if the pertinent measures had been undertaken by a 
Democratic administration? A plausible hypothesis would be that judges display an 
independent party effect -- in the sense that Republican appointees are more skeptical of 
Democratic administrations than of Republican administrations, while Democratic 
appointees show the opposite pattern.  
In important domains of administrative law, a party effect is indeed demonstrated. 
In reviewing interpretations of law by the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
National Labor Relations Board, federal judges are especially willing to uphold decision 
headed by a president of the same political party as the president who appointed them.
45 
Consider the following table
46: 
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Table 1 
Validation Rates of Court of Appeals Judges  
by Party of Appointing and Current President in Chevron Cases 
(Means, Standard Errors in Parentheses, and Number of Observations in Brackets) 
   Party of Current President 
Party of Appointing President  Total 
(1) 
Democratic 
(2) 
Republican 
(3) 
Difference of 
(2) – (3): 
(A) Democrat  .640 
(.027) 
[311] 
 
.698 
(.043) 
[116] 
.605 
(.035) 
[195] 
.093* 
(.056) 
(B) Republican  .637 
(.025) 
[369] 
 
.592 
(.038) 
[169] 
.675 
(.033) 
[200] 
–.083* 
(.050) 
Difference of (A) – (B):  .003 
(.037) 
 
.107* 
(.058) 
 
–.070 
(.048) 
— 
 
Note: * denotes difference significant at 10% level, and ** denotes difference significant at 5% level. 
Differences may not match exactly due to rounding. 
 
It would not be surprising if a similar effect were observed in the domain of 
national security. Perhaps Republican appointees would be less deferential to government 
intrusions on the domain of liberty, if those intrusions were undertaken by a Democratic 
administration. Perhaps Democratic appointees would be more deferential to government 
if a Democratic president headed the executive branch. It would be most valuable to see 
whether ideological compression would be observed under those circumstances.
47 
 
C. Panel Effects 
 
To understand the absence of discernible panel effects, we need to know 
something about ideological dampening and ideological amplification.  
1. Dampening. What causes ideological dampening? There are several answers. In 
some cases, the isolated judge is undoubtedly convinced by his colleagues 
notwithstanding a possible disposition to rule the other way. Sitting with two Republican 
appointees in an affirmative action case, the Democratic appointee might be persuaded 
that under existing law, the program is indefensible. In other cases, ideological 
dampening is likely a product of internal dynamics in which the isolated judge accepts 
the result in return for some concessions in the analysis. Sitting with two Democratic 
appointees in a campaign finance case, the Republican appointee might vote to uphold 
the program so long as the opinion is narrow and does not venture far beyond the 
particular facts. To this extent, ideological dampening, measured only in terms of votes, 
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probably understates the role of the isolated judge. Even if Rs look like Ds when they sit 
on majority D panels, and even if Ds look like Rs when they sit on majority R panels, 
they might have succeeded in moving the opinion in their preferred directions. 
In still other cases, the isolated judge may privately disagree with the result, but 
may conclude that it is not worthwhile to dissent. By hypothesis, a dissenting opinion will 
not change the outcome, and its production will take some work and may ruffle some 
feathers. It is true that on some occasions, a dissenting opinion might increase the 
likelihood of en banc or Supreme Court review, but both of these are relatively rare. For 
this reason, a judge might conclude that it is better to join the majority, on the ground that 
something is gained and nothing is lost. A form of internal cost-benefit balancing may 
argue in favor of the collegial concurrence even if the judge does not, in fact, agree with 
the majority’s conclusion. 
Finally, many judges appear to follow an informal rule of reciprocity, in 
accordance with which they will not always or even ordinarily dissent from opinions with 
which they do not agree, in the understanding that other judges will follow the same rule. 
The basic norm might well be to accept the majority’s conclusion, at least if the stakes 
are not terribly high, with the understanding that this norm is generally held. A rule of 
reciprocity would seem to fit well with the internal calculation in the usual run of cases: 
A dissenting opinion imposes burdens and by hypothesis is likely to produce no change, 
and hence it may makes sense for judges not to dissent despite their private 
disagreements. 
We might see ideological dampening as a reflection of the more general power of 
conformity pressures.
48 When people find themselves isolated with a different view from 
that of unanimous others, they often tend to yield.
49 They do so either because those 
views carry information about what is true, or because they do not want to appear wrong 
or confused to others.
50 The dynamic among federal judges is not at all the same, but it is 
overlapping. The evidence suggests that judges are apparently influenced by the views of 
their colleagues and they might well be attempting to avoid the disapproval, and 
occasional unpleasantness, that can be produced by a dissenting opinion. Note in this 
regard that ideological dampening can be found on every federal court of appeals – with 
the single exception of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
51 
According to informal lore, Republican and Democratic appointees do not get along well 
on that circuit,
52 and the absence of a norm of reciprocity may be partly cause and partly 
effect of that fact. 
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2.  Amplification. At first glance, ideological amplification seems more 
mysterious. Two Democratic appointees, on a three-judge panel with one Republican 
appointee, should be able to obtain the result they prefer. Why do they show significantly 
more moderate patterns on mixed panels than on unified ones?  
One explanation points to group polarization. It is well-known that like-minded 
people typically end up in a more extreme position in line with their predeliberation 
tendencies.
53 Perhaps RRR and DDD panels participate in a process of group 
polarization, in which judges move one another to more extreme voting patterns. The 
standard explanation of group polarization supports this account. On that account, such 
polarization is produced by the exchange of information within the relevant group.
54 If, 
for example, a group of people is discussing climate change, and is antecedently inclined 
to believe that it poses serious risks, the pool of arguments favors that antecedent belief. 
As those arguments are revealed, people tend to shift. It is easy to imagine a similar 
process within a judicial panel, as different arguments, in (say) a case involving disability 
discrimination, move people toward more extreme points on unified panels. 
An alternative explanation points not toward the relatively extreme behavior of 
judges on unified panels, but to the more moderate behavior of judges who constitute a 
majority on mixed panels. On this view, that more moderate behavior is what must be 
explained. The simplest account would stress a whistleblower effect.
55 The presence of a 
Republican appointee imposes a discipline on two Democratic appointees, just as the 
presence of a Democratic appointees imposes a discipline on two Republican appointees. 
Perhaps legally doubtful results are more possible on unified panels than on mixed ones, 
because of the absence of a whistleblower on the former. If this is so, that absence helps 
to explain the relatively extreme behavior of like-minded judges on unified panels. A 
softened version of the whistleblower argument would point not to results that are legally 
doubtful in any strong sense, but to the fact that the presence of a minority member may 
raise arguments and impose discipline on the majority, producing more moderate voting 
patterns. 
Note that whatever the explanation for ideological amplification, its actual effects 
are likely to be larger than what can be picked up by a quantitative examination of 
judicial voting patterns. Opinions matter, not merely votes, and if amplification is 
occurring, DDD and RRR panels are likely to show relatively extreme opinions. The 
empirical finding of ideological dampening is probably overstated in an important 
respect, because it does not speak to opinions, on which the isolated judge likely has an 
effect. By contrast, the empirical finding of amplification is probably understated, 
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because there is every reason to think that opinions are unusually extreme on unified 
panels. 
3. No dampening, no amplification. How, then, can the apparent absence of panel 
effects be explained in national security cases post-9/11? The best answer is that judicial 
judgments are firm – so much so that the views of panel members do not matter. In the 
domain of national security, differences between Republican and Democratic appointees 
appear to be so strongly held that the views of panel members simply do not matter. 
Ideological dampening does not occur for that reason. Compare the only other 
domains, to date, in which dampening has been found not to occur: capital punishment 
and abortion.
56 In those domains, the absence of dampening is not entirely surprising. If 
antecedent convictions are deeply held, none of the mechanisms that account for 
dampening will be strong enough to move judicial votes. In such areas, judges will not be 
convinced by their colleagues. They will be willing to do the work that is necessary to 
produce a dissent, perhaps in the hope of attracting Supreme Court attention or 
influencing future courts. They will be willing to create the kinds of disruption that might 
attend dissenting opinions. Where the stakes are high, the informal norm of reciprocity, 
reducing dissenting opinions, is qualified or breaks down. A key finding here the area of 
national security falls in the same category as abortion and capital punishment. 
 I have suggested that amplification occurs either because of group polarization or 
because of an absence of a whistleblower effect. But if judges already have quite strong 
convictions, then they are not likely to be polarized by internal discussions. And if judges 
do not trust those who purport to be whistleblowers, then they are not likely to be moved 
by them. These points help to explain why amplification is not observed here. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Some people believe that when national security is threatened, federal judges 
should adopt a strong presumption in favor of government action. Other people believe 
that when national security is threatened, federal judges need to maintain a strong hand in 
order to prevent official overreaching. The evidence suggests that in the aftermath of the 
attacks of 9/11, the courts of appeals have rejected both of these polar positions. They 
show unusually high deference rates without providing anything like a blank check to the 
executive. Notably and somewhat surprisingly, the rate of invalidation has not increased 
over time, as vivid memories of the attacks recede. 
At the same time, the significant split between Republican and Democratic 
appointees demonstrates that ideological differences are playing a large role in this 
domain. Indeed, the magnitude of the difference between the two sets of appointees is 
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similar to that in numerous other areas of law. Contrary to a plausible hypothesis, 
ideological compression is not observed. 
Perhaps the most striking finding involves the absence of panel effects. While the 
sample size is relatively small, the evidence suggests that judicial views are firmly 
entrenched, and hence judicial votes appear unaffected by the views of judicial 
colleagues. This is an unusual and noteworthy pattern. Ideological dampening and 
ideological amplification are pervasive on the federal courts of appeals, but they cannot 
be found in national security cases post-9/11.  
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